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ARE ALL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CREATED EQUAL? 
REFLECTIONS ON THE ILC’S DRAFT ARTICLES OF RESPONSIBILITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
On 26 April 2011 the International Law Commission (‘ILC’ or  ‘Commission’) 
adopted on second reading its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations (‘Draft Articles’ or  ‘DARIO’). These articles aim to codify a set of 
secondary rules that are applicable to the very wide variety of international 
organizations (‘IOs’) that now exist. The aim of this Global Governance Opinion is 
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not to analyze in detail any particular aspect of the Draft Articles; rather, we will 
discuss briefly some of the methodological and conceptual issues faced by ILC, 
and how this has impacted the final outcome of its work.  
 
In 2000 the ILC decided that the topic “Responsibility of international 
organizations” should be included in its long term programme of work, and in 2001 
the UN General Assembly formally requested the ILC to begin work on the topic.1 
The Commission took up this project at the time when its Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility (‘DASR’) were nearing completion. The topic of responsibility of 
international organizations was viewed as being a ’necessary counterpart’ to this 
work, as it would logically flow on from its work on state responsibility.2 This 
approach mirrors the way in which the ILC took up its work on the law of treaties 
between states and international organizations after it had it completed work on 
the law of treaties between states. In a similar way, the ILC would use the DASR 
as a logical starting point for drafting its articles relating to IOs. 
 
From the start it can be questioned whether there really was a need for a set of 
draft articles on the responsibility of IOs. According to the ILC’s Statute, the 
Commission should consider codification of topics that are “necessary and 
desirable”.3 In addition, the Commission has itself established some criteria for the 
selection of topics. To be included in its programme, a proposed topic should  (i) 
”reflect the needs of States in respect of the progressive development and 
codification of international law”; (ii) “be sufficiently advanced in stage in terms of 
State practice to permit progressive development and codification” and should be 
(iii) “concrete and feasible for progressive development and codification”.4 It can 
be doubted seriously whether the topic of the responsibility of IOs met these 
criteria. 
 
In 2000 Alain Pellet addressed the subject of the desirability of the proposed topic 
                                                 
1
 UNGA, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-second session, UN Doc. 
A/Res/55/152, para 8.: “Requests the International Law Commission, taking into account paragraph 259 
of its report, to begin its work on the topic “Responsibility of international organizations” and to give 
further consideration to the remaining topics to be included in its long-term programme of work, having 
due regard to comments made by Governments.” 
2
 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-second session, 1 May - 9 June 
and 10 July - 18 August 2000, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth session, Supplement 
No.10. UN Doc. A/55/10, p. 135. 
3
 Statute of the International Law Commission (1947) Adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 
174 (II) of 21 November 1947, as amended by resolutions 485 (V) of 12 December 1950, 984 (X) of 3 
December 1955, 985 (X) of 3 December 1955 and 36/39 of 18 November 1981, Art. 18 (2).  
4
 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-second session, 1 May - 9 June 
and 10 July - 18 August 2000, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth session, Supplement 
No.10. UN Doc. A/55/10. 
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with reference to the ILC criteria and concluded that the topic meets these criteria 
“in every respect”.5 He stated that the topic “is sufficiently advanced in stage in 
terms of State practice, which is not well known, but now quite abundant” although 
he provided no examples of such state practice except for a general reference to 
the United Nations Juridical Yearbook. Of the practice that has been cited 
subsequently, it is often not directly related to the issue of responsibility, but on 
related issues such as the legal personality of IOs.6 It turned out that this lack of 
practice proved to be one of the greatest difficulties the ILC faced. The ILC states 
in its commentary  that “[o]ne of the main difficulties in elaborating rules 
concerning the responsibility of international organizations is due to the limited 
availability of pertinent practice.”7 Much of the criticism of the DARIO stems from 
the fact that the ILC undertook a project to codify an area of law that is seriously 
lacking in relevant international practice.8  Whereas the topic of state responsibility 
is relatively advanced and is based on an extensive body of state practice, the 
topic of responsibility for international organizations remains far less developed.  
 
With regard to the desirability of the topic, there never seemed to be a strong 
desire from states themselves for such a topic to be addressed by the ILC. One 
may argue that the topic was ripe for codification because international 
organizations are becoming more numerous, more complex, and ever capable of 
causing serious harm through their acts and omissions. This is a common 
argument, based on the fact that IOs are now involved in acts such as 
peacekeeping missions that might lead to the commission of internationally 
wrongful acts, as well as the lack of legal mechanisms to bring IOs to account.9 
However, the need for accountability mechanisms should not be equated with the 
requirement for codified secondary rules on responsibility, which the ILC has 
produced. The DARIO do not address the real obstacles preventing individuals 
from bringing IOs to account, such as the lack of available judicial forums or 
                                                 
5
 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-second session, 1 May - 9 June 
and 10 July - 18 August 2000, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth session, Supplement 
No.10, p. 135. 
6
 G. Hafner, “Is the Topic of Responsibility of International Organizations Ripe for Codification? Some 
Critical Remarks”, in U. Fastenrath et. al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in 
Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford University Press, 2011), 700-701. 
7
 DARIO, General Commentary, p. 2, para. 5.  
8
 G. Hafner, “Is the Topic of Responsibility of International Organizations Ripe for Codification? Some 
Critical Remarks”, in U. Fastenrath et. al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in 
Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford University Press, 2011), 700. 
9
 This is reflected in Pellet’s comments that  “many specific problems arise in this regard and they 
should become increasingly numerous in view of the resumption of the operational activities of 
international organizations and, in particular, activities by the United Nations to maintain international 
peace and security.” Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-second session, 
1 May - 9 June and 10 July - 18 August 2000, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth 
session, Supplement No.10, p. 135.  
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procedural obstacles such as the immunity of IOs before domestic courts.10 
 
It can also be questioned whether the topic was in fact “feasible for progressive 
development and codification”. This subject matter is extremely complex and 
fraught with conceptual difficulties. Probably the main difficulty faced by the ILC 
relates to the diversity of international organizations. In his final report, Special 
Rapporteur Gaja noted that: 
 
There are very significant differences among international 
organizations with regard to their powers and functions, size of 
membership, relations between the organization and its 
members, procedures for deliberation, structure and facilities, 
as well as the primary rules including treaty obligations by 
which they are bound. Because of this diversity and its 
implications, the draft articles where appropriate give weight to 
the specific character of the organization (…).11 
 
The issue of diversity was often brought up by international organizations 
themselves in the comments they submitted to the ILC. The Secretariat of the 
United Nations pointed to the need to take into account the “specificities of the 
various international organizations”.12 The strongest supporter of this argument 
was the European Community/Union, which argued that the Draft Articles failed to 
take into account the unique nature of the EU, specifically its role as a regional 
economic integration organization (REIO).13 The European Commission 
consistently argued that it was inappropriate to establish universal rules for IOs: 
 
The European Commission expresses some concerns as to 
the feasibility of subsuming all international organizations 
under the terms of this one draft in the light of the highly 
diverse nature of international organizations, of which the 
                                                 
10
 J. Wouters, E. Brems, S. Smis and P. Schmitt, “Introductory Remarks”, in J. Wouters, E. Brems, S. 
Smis and P. Schmitt (eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organisations, 
Antwerp-Oxford, Intersentia, 2010, 11. 
11
 DARIO General Commentary, p. 3, para. 7. 
12
 Eighth report on responsibility of international organizations by Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur, 
International Law Commission Sixty-third session Geneva, 26 April-3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011.  
13
 See E. Paasivirta and P. J. Kuijper, “Does One Size Fit All?”, 36 Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law (2005), pp. 169–226. 
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European Community is itself an example.14 
 
In this respect, the ILC had several options with regard to its approach to 
institutional diversity. Firstly, it could have limited the Draft Articles to a limited 
range of organizations.  It could have focused, for example, on the more 
‘traditional’ intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations. This 
would have reflected one of the main driving forces behind the codification 
process, namely responsibility arising from the conduct of peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement operations.15 Another approach could have been to develop 
different rules for different types of organizations. Such an approach was 
considered at an early stage in  the ILC’s work: 
 
The definition of international organizations given above 
comprises entities of a quite different nature. Membership, 
functions, ways of deliberating and means at their disposal 
vary so much that with regard to responsibility it may be 
unreasonable to look for general rules applying for all 
intergovernmental organizations, especially with regard to the 
issue of responsibility into which States may incur for activities 
of the organization of which they are members. It may be 
necessary to devise specific rules for different categories of 
international organizations.16 
 
The proposal of devising different rules for different types of organizations was 
never followed, however. Attempts within academic literature to ‘categorize’ IOs 
into different types proved extremely difficult. Instead, the ILC has attempted to 
establish universal rules that can be applicable to the wide variety of IOs, 
irrespective of type. It rejected an approach that would treat IOs differently, such 
                                                 
14
 International Law Commission Sixtieth session Geneva, 5 May-6 June and 7 July-8 August 2007 
Responsibility of international organizations Comments and observations received from international 
organizations, p. 4.  
15
 “A further reason for a need for the codification of responsibility of international organisations seems 
to be the call for growing accountability of international organisations conducting military-like operations 
such as peacekeeping operations”: G. Hafner, ‘Is the Topic of Responsibility of International 
Organizations Ripe for Codification? Some Critical Remarks’, in U. Fastenrath et. al. (eds.), From 
Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford University Press, 
2011), 700; Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-second session, 1 May - 
9 June and 10 July - 18 August 2000, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth session, 
Supplement No.10, p. 135. 
16
 Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-fourth session, (29 April-7 June and 22 July-16 
August 2002) para. 470. 
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as including special rules for organizations like the EU.17  Blokker, too, has argued 
in favour of establishing one set of general rules18, reasoning that just as the many 
differences between states do not require different rules of state responsibility, the 
diversity of IOs does not necessitate different rules. However, from the viewpoint 
of public international law, states are identical legal entities irrespective of their 
culture, political system, or size. The same cannot be said of IOs, which, although 
they may have (some degree of) international legal personality, remain very 
heterogeneous legal entities. 
 
By taking this approach, the ILC was faced with the challenge of developing rules 
that are both broad enough to have universal application, yet capable of taking 
into account the institutional diversity of IOs. The ILC therefore drafted the articles, 
including the definition of ‘international organization’ in a broad manner, seeking to 
capture a wide variety of IOs. The definition adopted includes all international 
organizations, not just ‘intergovernmental organizations’.19 It includes bodies that 
have non-states as members20 as well as bodies that might be established upon a 
basis other than a treaty.21 While the ambit remains very wide, the ILC sought to 
include rules that would still take into account the diversity of IOs, including 
instances where the internal rules of the IO are taken into account. For example, 
the DARIO  includes numerous references to the ‘rules of the organization’22 and 
a specific rule on lex specialis.23 Despite these rules, international organizations 
like the EU continue to be of the opinion that there is not enough in the DARIO to 
take into account the diversity of IOs. This includes complex questions regarding 
rules of attribution between the EU and its Member States and the conferral of 
powers to the EU. Noting that the Draft Articles will likely have a significant effect 
on it, the EU noted that “the draft articles do not sufficiently address the special 
                                                 
17
 On this topic see S. Talmon, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations: Does the European 
Community Require Special Treatment?’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today. 
Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden, Brill, 2005), 405-421. 
18
  “[W]hile it is true that there is a great variety of international organizations, it may be questioned why 
this should imply that there should be a great variety of responsibility rules for these organizations and 
why there could not be one set of rules”: N. M. Blokker, ‘Preparing articles on responsibility of 
international organizations: Does the International Law Commission take international organizations 
seriously? A mid-term review’, in J. Klabbers and A. Wallendahl (eds.), Research Handbook On the Law 
of International Organizations (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011), p. 335. 
19
 Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, with commentaries (2011) Adopted 
by the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, in 2011, and submitted to the General 
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/66/10), Article 2(a). 
20
 DARIO, Art. 2(a): “… International organizations may include as members, in addition to States, other 
entities..”. 
21
 DARIO, Art. 2(a) :”’international organization’ means an organization established by a treaty or other 
instrument governed by international law”. 
22
 See C. Ahlborn, ‘The Rules of International Organizations and the Law of International 
Responsibility’, Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-04. 
23
 DARIO, Art. 64.  
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characteristics of the European Union as a regional integration organisation.“24  
 
Another common criticism is that the ILC followed too closely the DASR. This 
criticism that the Commission has ‘slavishly’ copied from the ASR might be 
overstated. In many cases the ILC has ensured that it has made appropriate 
changes to adapt the rules to the situation of IOs. Our criticism does not lie with 
how well the ILC ‘adapted’ specific articles, however. The flaw lies in the way the 
ILC used the DASR as its logical starting point. The Commission gives little 
justification for basing its work on rules developed in the context of state 
responsibility. This approach assumes that IOs and states can be treated in a 
similar manner since they are both international legal persons. Importantly, this 
means that where gaps exist in practice, the DASR would be used to fill these 
gaps and would provide the basis of new rules. This approach helps to brush over 
the fact that in many areas international practice gives no guidance whatsoever. 
Simply basing a rule on the DASR in the absence of applicable practice, 
especially when that rule was developed in a context only applicable to states, 
may lead to unforeseen difficulties for IOs. This approach pushes the DARIO far 
closer toward ‘progressive development’ of the law than to codification. 
 
Since the Draft Articles will likely have a real impact on the functioning of IOs, the 
IOs themselves should have been given a greater voice in developing the articles. 
The ILC attempted to include international organizations in its work, for instance, 
by inviting IOs to submit comments on the draft articles. Having given IOs this 
opportunity, it seems that in many cases these comments were not addressed, 
either in the articles themselves or the commentary. This gives the impression that 
the ILC gave a much higher status to the opinions of states, who in addition to 
submitting comments to the Commission, also have the chance to discuss its work 
within the 6th Committee of the UN General Assembly. In this way, the ILC’s 
methodology remains overwhelmingly state-oriented. Moreover, out of the 
hundreds of IOs that exist, only a small number actually provided comments. This 
probably shows both the lack of practice available as well as the view among a 
majority of IOs that the DARIO will simply not be relevant to them.  
 
 
                                                 
24
 EU Statement - United Nations 6th Committee: Report of the International Law Commission on 
Responsibility of International Organisations, Statement on behalf of the European Union by Lucio 
Gussetti, Director, Principal Legal Adviser, European Commission, at the UN General Assembly 6th 
Committee (Legal) 66th Session: Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-
third session on Responsibility of International Organisations, 24 October 2011. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
While much of the ILC’s work has been well-received and has been extremely 
influential on international law, other work has been abandoned or disregarded.  
To avoid this, the ILC developed criteria that should be fulfilled before embarking 
upon new areas of codification. The success of the DASR and  the desire to 
complete its work on international responsibility were obvious reasons for the ILC 
to take up the topic of responsibility of IOs. One can understand the desire to 
complete this capstone work, which  at first glance seems to flow logically from the 
ILC’s previous work on state responsibility as well as its codification of the law of 
treaties applicable to states and IOs. Yet there remain important conceptual 
questions about the status of IOs in international law which make this subject a 
poor candidate for codification. More importantly, there is a serious lack of 
relevant practice on which to develop universally applicable rules. This has led the 
ILC to over-rely on the structure and substantive rules that were included in the 
DASR.  Importantly, while the issue of accountability of IOs remains an important 
one for international law, the DARIO does little to combat this problem. It has been 
suggested that the ILC could have begun instead with a more general study on 
international organizations, similar to the one it conducted on fragmentation of 
international law, in order to further explore the topic before embarking on the 
more ambitious project of codification. Such an approach may have been far more 
useful for international lawyers than what sometimes appears to be a ‘cut and 
paste’ from its earlier work on state responsibility. 
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